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DOES "EFFICIENT" MEAN "BETTER"?
WILLIAM J. WOODWARD, JR.*
Recently, state legislatures have undertaken procedural reform of the
judgment collection system. In this Article, Professor Woodivard reviews
these changes, noting that despite an apparent improvement in the effi-
ciency of judgment collection, the statutes have many potential side ef-
fects. In light of the impact the statutes may have on state taxpayers,
small creditors, and the federal bankruptcy system, Woodward cautions
state legislatures to move slowly in adopting the reforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Not many would argue that yesterday's cumbersome rules of
procedure are intrinsically superior to the lean, efficient proce-
dural rules of today. Just as the flashy styles of nineteenth-
century Victorian architecture have made room for the unem-
bellished twentieth-century styles, the nineteenth century's in-
tricate, tangled procedural law has been displaced by the twen-
tieth century's clean, unadorned, simplified approach. Indeed,
students of the law have come to accept as gospel the idea that
procedural reform means less complexity-that the most effi-
cient procedure in settling disputed rights is the best.' In pro-
cedure as in architecture, We have come to think that clean and
trim is simply better.
One edifice of legal procedure has largely escaped the twen-
tieth-century wrecking ball: the procedural law that greets the
plaintiff who, upon recovering a civil money judgment, must
attempt to collect it from a defendant who will not or cannot
* Professor of Law, Temple University. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1968; J.D.,
Rutgers University, 1975. Special thanks to Amy Boss, Lissa Broome, David Papke,
Elizabeth Warren, Bill Whitford, Harold Weinberg and Richard Woodward for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Donna Byrne for her research and editorial
assistance.
I Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, made the point as follows:
"Everybody knows that the vast network of highly technical rules of evidence and
procedure which prevails in this country serves to tangle justice in the name of form.
It is a disgrace to our profession." 15 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 119 (1931). See also Miller, The
Proposed Federal Procedure Rules, I1 TUL. L. REv. 425 (1937) (finding the objective
of simplifying civil procedure to be commendable).
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pay. The procedure is a legal eyesore. It is crowded with writs,
sheriffs, obscure actions, 2 and traps for the uninitiated; the pro-
cedure differs in every state and its statutory foundations are
often scattered throughout a state's code. Surely many a victor
has emerged from exhausting litigation only to learn from her
lawyer that collecting the judgment will cost more than the
judgment is worth. 3 If ever a system demanded less complexity
and more simplicity and efficiency, it is the judgment collection
system.
Three states have responded with significant procedural re-
forms that promise to make the collection process more efficient
by allowing judgment creditors to gain nonpossessory liens on
their debtors' personal property. As a long-overdue innovation,
the legislation deserves description, scrutiny, and analysis in its
own right. But the increased efficiency these changes bring to
the collection process raises a host of issues that might not be
apparent to the observer steeped in the "efficient is better".
fashion of twentieth-century procedural reform.
Using these procedural reforms as a specific focus, this Article
examines the implications of increased efficiency in the judicial
collection process within the debtor-creditor system. The anal-
ysis proceeds at two levels of generality. The first level examines
the statutes and their impact on the execution process. The
statutes are viewed narrowly, ignoring the effects they might
have in the broader debtor-creditor system. Part II begins with
the background needed to understand the new provisions and
Part III shows how they operate. The analysis in Parts II and
III demonstrates how the new procedures will make judgment
collection a less expensive, easier process for creditors and
therefore shows that the statutes can be called more "efficient." '4
2 "Amercement," for example, is an action that asserts that the sheriff failed within
the execution process to discharge his duties. See generally Wyatt, Amercement of
Sheriffs, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237 (1974); Meyers, In League with the League, 65
COM. L. J. 238 (1960); 9 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 37A.12[B] (1989).
3 See generally Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Col-
lection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970).
4 In Parts II and III, "efficient" means that it takes less time, effort, or money for a
party to achieve the same result with the new procedures than with the old. In this
narrow sense, the provisions apparently save economic resources. As will be suggested
in Part IV, however, widespread use of these less expensive procedures might yield
reactions in other parts of the debtor-creditor system that cost more than the new




Yet if enthusiasm for the new legislation is generated by Parts
II and III, Part IV will dampen it. In Part IV, the Article moves
to the second level of analysis and takes a critical look at the
statutes in the much broader context of the debtor-creditor sys-
tem. Considered in the context in which the statutes will actually
operate, these new provisions, which make collecting judgments
easier and less complicated, become troubling.
Among the problems with the legislation are the following:
First, the new statutes may make bankruptcy a less viable option
for those whose interests it now serves. Second, they may
provoke increased use of the legal system as creditors without
judgments scramble to secure judgments that give them access
to the new procedures. Third, and related to the second point,
the new statutes may give a priority advantage to those rela-
tively few large creditors who are expert at getting judgments.
Fourth, they may shift some of the costs of collection from
debtors and creditors to taxpayers both in and outside of bank-
ruptcy. Finally, the statutes seem likely to yield a redistribution
of leverage away from the debtor class and toward the creditor
class, a political issue that needs to be addressed by legislators
considering the new provisions. Ultimately, the analysis in Part
IV suggests that when they operate in context, the statutes may
turn out not to be truly "efficient" at all; rather, they may yield
greater overall system losses than the archaic system currently
in place.
The two-level analysis pursued here thus serves additional
purposes. It demonstrates that one's normative judgments-
even when "efficiency" is the standard for judging-can depend
on the level of generality within which one looks at legal
change.5 The analysis further indicates that in the extraordinar-
ily interconnected debtor-creditor system, a very broad context
for viewing legal change is more likely to produce valid conclu-
sions. Finally, the analysis may even prompt some to wonder
whether our attraction to "efficiency" in legal procedure, like
our embrace of clean lines in architecture, may be more the
product of fashion and popular culture than we might otherwise
think.
5 This point was made in the context of tort law in Balkin, Too Good to be True: The
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1477-78 (1987).
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II. REFERENCE
A. The Immediate Context of the New Statutes
California, Connecticut, and Maine have each recently de-
veloped statutes that enable a judgment creditor to get a non-
possessory lien on a debtor's personal property by filing a simple
document 6 in an appropriate state office.7 In other states ajudg-
ment holder must usually proceed with expensive execution
proceedings in order to get a lien on the debtor's personalty. If
the judgment holder does not have a lien, the debtor can jeop-
ardize the judgment holder's interests by paying other creditors,
frittering away assets, or entering bankruptcy with the law's
blessing.8
The only way for a judgment creditor to get a lien on personal
property as distinguished from real estate is to commence ex-
ecution proceedings and levy on it. 9 This costly procedure gen-
erally requires that the creditor locate leviable property, file
numerous documents, motivate and direct the sheriff, and hope
that the execution does not precipitate bankruptcy.
If the debtor owns unencumbered real estate, the situation is
dramatically different. In most places, a simple filing by the
judgment creditor in an appropriate office fixes a nonpossessory
6 Maine requires ajudgment creditor to file a court-issued execution in order to obtain
a judgment lien. While it requires the issuance and filing of an execution, obtaining a
lien by this method is considerably less complex than taking the writ to the sheriff,
having the sheriff execute it, and hoping that the sheriff can seize something of value.
7 See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
8 The law of fraudulent conveyances, of course, places some restraints on the defen-
dant's freedom to dispose of assets while a judgment is in force. See generally UNIF.
FRAUD. CONv. ACT OF 1918; UNIF. FRAUD. TRANSFER ACT OF 1984. The classic treatise
in the area is G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed.
1940).
9 But see ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-80 (1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-191 (1972). In these three states, a judgment creditor has long obtained
priority in all of a debtor's personal property without actually executing on it. Illustrative
is Georgia's statute which provides:
All judgments obtained in the superior courts, justice of the peace courts, or
other courts of this state shall be of equal dignity and shall bind all the property
of the defendant in judgment, both real and personal, from the date of such
judgments except as otherwise provided in this Code.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-80 (1982). A later provision, however, makes the lien so obtained
invalid as to "third parties acting in good faith and without notice who have acquired a
transfer or lien binding the property of the defendant in judgment." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-12-81 (1982).
For several reasons, other states shunned the approach of these states in favor of a
process requiring actual execution for creation of a lien. See infra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
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lien to the real estate and thereby preserves the creditor's po-
sition inexpensively and without wresting possession from the
debtor.10 This alternative may be all that is needed to get paid."'
Consider, then, the dilemma facing the traditional unpaid judg-
ment creditor whose debtor has no unencumbered real estate.
If the creditor does nothing, she has no priority at all and risks
losing the value of the judgment if the debtor's situation dete-
riorates further. If, on the other hand, she levies on, for exam-
ple, the debtor's inventory, the debtor may be prompted to
respond with a bankruptcy petition to halt and avoid the exec-
ution and to preserve the business. In short, the creditor can do
nothing and risk deterioration of the hard-won value of the
judgment, or she can spend the funds to execute on it and risk
throwing more good money after bad. High procedural cost,
risk of further losses, and uncertainty of result are the hallmarks
of the execution system generally and, more specifically, the
process for obtaining priority in personal property. As models
of inefficient procedure, execution systems may have no equals.
B. The Larger Context
Execution statutes and judgment lien statutes are only small
pieces of the much larger debtor-creditor system. The combi-
nation of discrete elements of that system working with and
against one another is what establishes the relationships be-
tween debtors and creditors as groups. The most important thing
to recognize here is that because the disparate parts of the
system have strong ties to one another, one cannot assess
change in one corner of the system without considering the
consequences of the change throughout the system. Exemption
statutes,12 the federal Bankruptcy Code 3 and its state analogues,
10 Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island have no
such provisions. See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTEC-
TION 89 (4th ed. 1987).
I When the lien appears with the real estate records, potential purchasers and lenders
will discover the judgment lien because record searches typically accompany real estate
transfers. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.500 (1986); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5203(a)
(McKinney 1978). When they discover it, potential purchasers will recognize that the
lien will be superior to their interests and will modify their own behavior when dealing
with the debtor. Indeed, to avoid their own involvement with the judgment creditor,
prospective lenders and buyers may require the debtor to satisfy the lien as a eordition
to their secured loan or purchase of the property.
12 Exemption provisions are discussed in sections IV, B and IV, C, 1 of this ArtiCle.
,1 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-329 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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lending regulations,1 4 priority rules in secured financing 5 and
other state laws creating liens, and extralegal methods used by
debtors to avoid repaying debt and by creditors to collect debt
are all part of the larger picture.
Considering legal change in this large, extraordinarily com-
plex context makes analysis difficult. Each piece of the system
is connected to the others in various ways, and movement in
one part of the system yields some reaction in other parts.
Lawyers for creditors and debtors understand the interrela-
tionship of these parts even if others do not. These scores of
rules, practices, freedoms, and inefficiencies come together
every day in an informal collection process, within which cred-
itors and debtors settle with one another without direct recourse
to the legal system. 16 Legal change in any corner of the larger
system undoubtedly affects the everyday negotiations between
creditors and their debtors. Most debts are not collected coer-
cively; debtors and creditors both know that the formal legal
system is often far too expensive to be of much use in debt
collection.' 7 Thus, in addition to assessing the impact of change
on the operation of other formal rules within the larger system,
it is important to address the impact that a legal innovation
might have on the informal process of negotiation and
settlement.
Improving the efficiency of the collection process-making
the formal legal system less expensive to use-seems likely to
increase creditors' recourse to lawyers and courts in collecting
debts. This raises a multitude of questions. For example, what
impact might increased use of formal processes for debt collec-
tion have on our already-burdened legal system? Is it desirable
to reduce the strong incentives debtors and creditors now have
to arrive at consensual settlements? If creditors will more read-
14 Usury laws are perhaps the oldest examples of lending regulations. More recently,
attention has focused on wage assignments, which came under scrutiny in the early
1930's and eventually were prohibited. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(3) (1989) (unfair credit
practice to accept assignment of future wages unless revocable at will by debtor or
preauthorized payroll deduction plan). The Federal Trade Commission rule prohibiting
a debtor from creating a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest in sub-
stantially all her personal property is a lending regulation of more recent origin. 16
C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1989).
5 The primary source of these priority rules today is Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.).
16 The legal system; of course, operates here most importantly as the context or
backdrop for negotiation. See Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection
System, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49, 1057-58 (1979).
17 Id. at 1054.
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ily compete in the courts rather than informally for the debtor's
assets, are some creditors naturally better suited to the com-
petition than others? After considering the specifics of the new
statutes and their effects on discrete legal regimes elsewhere
within the debtor-creditor system, this Article will try to assess
the impact these statutes might have on this important informal
process.
III. THE STATUTES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 18
A. Introduction
California, Connecticut, and Maine have each made it inex-
pensive and easy for a judgment creditor to get a judgment lien
on personalty. In each state, a judgment creditor can, by filing
an appropriate document in the correct office, stake a claim to
much of a debtor's personal property. The lien created by this
procedure will secure the judgment creditor's priority in the
personalty against many later claimants. Obtaining a judgment
lien in these states is possible without using the sheriff, without
removing the property from the debtor's control, and without
much of the risk and cost one must sustain in other states to
get a similar priority advantage. Given the long history of judg-
ment liens on real property, one might preliminarily consider
why such innovation took so long to arrive.
The absence of a dependable, centralized, routinely utilized
system for recording title to personal property is surely a first
reason. The lack of such a system no doubt raised the fear that
buyers or lenders would advance money on personal property
without any real chance of learning about a nonpossessory judg-
ment lien. 19 With real estate, prospective buyers or mortgagees
typically examine the public record as part of the transactions
creating their interests. As long as the judgment lien is recorded
where they look, they learn about it and adjust their assessment
"8 The author developed early ideas for this Part in 9 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
37A.03[Bl[3] (1989).
19 Policy makers have been increasingly concerned with ensuring that parties poten-
tially affected get notice of the execution process. See 9 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
37A.03[B][I][a] (1989). The legislative concern with the bona fide purchaser has,
however, more recently been questioned in another context. See, e.g., Gilmore, The
Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Re-
pentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981).
1990]
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of the transaction accordingly. By contrast, a procedure for filing
judgment liens against personalty would have been unlikely to
alert those who might purchase encumbered chattels from the
debtor. Until the appearance and assimilation of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), secured lending consisted
of a hodgepodge of legal devices with separate files for record
keeping. As it was, buyers and lenders had difficulty determining
which files to examine. It is not obvious that another set of files
to record judgment liens on personal property would have of-
fered realistic prospects for satisfying a felt need for real notice.
In addition, personal property has been economically incon-
sequential for most of our history. Indeed, early execution pro-
cedures themselves did not even extend to intangible assets, 20
now a main category of personal property. This lack of impor-
tance probably eased whatever pressure there otherwise might
have been to extend judgment liens to personal property.
Two twentieth-century developments have contributed to the
political feasibility of extending judgment liens to personal prop-
erty. The first is the extraordinary rise in importance of intan-
gible wealth and the legal system's increasing sophistication in
dealing with it.21 The second is the arrival of Article 9 of the
U.C.C. with its simplified filing systems. 22
Article 9 of the U.C.C. permits one to take a security interest
in all the debtor's personal property-tangible and intangible-
inexpensively and easily. A very simple filing makes the security
interest thereby created good against most competing claimants
including, in most cases, the trustee in bankruptcy. 23 Article 9
satisfies a craving for notice through its accessible recording
system and through complex priority provisions that extend
special protection to many who might not be expected to check
personal property files.
20 Loyd, Executions at Common Law, 62 U. PA. L. REV. 354, 363 (1914).
21 See C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 60-63 (3d ed. 1983); Dolzer, Welfare
Benefits as Property Interests: A Constitutional Right to a Hearing in Judicial Review,
29 ADMIN. L. REV. 525 (1977); Reich, The New Wealth, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964);
Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Property, 64 Ky. L.J. 49 (1975).
2 The U.C.C. is simplified only in relation to what preceded it. A national filing
system, though possible today with modem technology, has not yet arrived. Currently,
secured lenders must cope with a central file in each state and with local county files
within each of those jurisdictions. This has resulted in very complex provisions designed
to steer filing and searching creditors to the correct file. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 401 (1978).
23 One exception is when the debtor gives a security interest to secure preexisting
debt. A security interest thus secured can be successfully attacked as a preference in
some cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
[Vol. 27:1
1990] New Judgment Liens 9
As will be detailed below, Connecticut, Maine, and California
have taken the natural next step by building on these recent
commercial law developments. Their procedures for getting a
nonpossessory judgment lien are generally to file a simple form
within the U.C.C. filing system.2 4 Given Article 9, its filing
system, and the commercial practice that has developed in its
wake, we might now expect such a public filing to alert some
potential claimants that the judgment creditor has a claim to the
debtor's property. In enacting these provisions, these states
have sensibly determined that today's creditors need not seize
the debtor's personalty in order to put all competitors on notice
of their interests .25
B. The New Provisions
1. The Statutes Themselves
Connecticut's new provisions are the least complicated of the
three. Section 52-355a specifies in part:
(a) Except in the case of a consumer judgment, a judgment
lien... may be placed on any nonexempt personal property
in which, by a filing in the office of the secretary of the state,
21 In addition, Iowa has a provision which uses the U.C.C. files within the levy process
to create a nonpossessory lien in favor of the judgment creditor. IowA R. Civ. P. 260(b)
reads:
If the creditor or his agent first so requests in writing, the officer may view the
property, inventory its exact description at length, and append such inventory
to the execution... ; and, if the property is consumer goods or if the judgment
debtor is not a resident of this state, file with the County Recorder of the
county where the property is located his certified transcript of such inventory
and statement; and, in all other cases, file with the Secretary of State his
certified transcript of such inventory and statement. Such filing shall be ac-
cepted by the County Recorder or the Secretary of State as a financing state-
ment ... and shall be constructive notice of the levy to all persons .... The
fees normally charged by the County Recorder or Secretary of State for the
filing of a financing statement and the filing of a termination statement shall be
paid by the officer and shall be taxed by him as a part of his costs of the levy.
Iowa's procedure uses the U.C.C. files to give the judgment creditor an additional way
to execute on the judgment. While the new levy does not separate the judgment debtor
from his property, the procedure involves the sheriff and execution procedures generally.
In that respect they resemble execution procedures more than they do the judgment
lien procedures.
Similarly, Minnesota allows a U.C.C. filing to function as a levy "when personal
property, by reason of its bulk or other cause, cannot be immediately removed." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 550.13 (Supp. 1987).
2 The new procedures differ fundamentally from those long existing in Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi by enlisting accessible and frequently-used U.C.C. files to
supply notice to those who might later assert interests in personalty. See supra note 9.
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a security interest could be perfected under title 42a. The
judgment lien shall be created by filing a judgment lien cer-
tificate in the office of the secretary of the state.
(c) Any such judgment lien shall be effective, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a similar security interest
under the provisions of title 42a .... 26
By explicitly tying the lien to the interest created under Article
9 of the U.C.C., Connecticut permits, in its title 42a, the judg-
ment creditor to secure her judgment with the equivalent of an
Article 9 security interest.
Maine's provision is comparable. It reads in part:
§ 4651-A. EXECUTION LIENS
2. LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. The filing of an execu-
tion duly issued by any court of this State or an attested
copy thereof with the proper place or places for perfecting
a security interest in personal property pursuant to Title 11,
section 9-401, subsections (1) and (5) within one year after
issuance of the execution shall create a lien in favor of each
judgment creditor upon the right, title and interest of each
judgment debtor in personal property which is not exempt
from attachment and execution and which is of a type against
which a security interest could be perfected by filing pur-
suant to Title 11, section 9-401.27
Unlike the Connecticut statute, Maine's provision is ambiguous
on questions of priority. As will be developed below, the result
is that some battles between judgment lienholders and other
claimants will have less than certain results.
California has been the most explicit in defining and refining2 8
its new provisions. In their broad compass, California's provi-
sions are similar to the others. The judgment creditor may file
a "notice of judgment lien on personal property"2 9 with the
Secretary of State30 and obtain priority in the debtor's business
property3' against other claimants largely in accordance with the
priority scheme in Article 9 of the U.C.C.
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-355a (West 1986).
27 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4651-A (Supp. 1988).
2 The California provisions, first enacted in 1982, have gone through at least one
major revision since that time.
2 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.550 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
30 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.570 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
3, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.530 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
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Both California and Connecticut have tried to exclude con-
sumer debtors from the reach of the new procedures. 32 Maine
has no comparable exclusion.
2. Cost and Risk Considerations
Compared with the alternatives available in other jurisdic-
tions, these new procedures are extraordinarily "efficient, '33
because they reduce the costs and risks of converting a mere
judgment into a specific claim to assets. Before considering the
priority in specific assets that these new systems supply, it is
worth comparing generally the costs of getting something more
than an unsecured judgment under these new systems with the
costs a creditor must sustain under more traditional systems.
If the creditor's objective is merely to establish priority, the
new systems save one the costs of executing on a judgment in
order to get priority. Execution in many places involves metic-
ulous document preparation, 34 involvement with the sheriff's
office, and, to be successful, personal attention from the lawyer
during this extended process. Under the new procedures, the
costs of getting priority are those of completing a financing
statement form and filing it. In many cases, the cost savings
possible under the new schemes are sizeable.
Under the old systems, the general need to direct the sheriff
to assets and the relatively high costs of execution make it ill-
advised for a creditor to attempt execution without knowing the
32 Connecticut directly excludes judgments against consumers. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-355a (West 1986). Although Connecticut's language, "except in the case of
a consumer judgment" could be read as "except in the case of a judgment held by a
consumer," it seems more likely that Connecticut attempted to protect consumers rather
than disadvantage them by the exclusion. As will be seen infra text accompanying notes
127-131, Connecticut might not have delivered all the consumer protection it may have
intended.
California's legislation has a similar effect by extending the lien only to U.C.C.
categories of property less likely to be held by consumers than businesses, e.g., ac-
counts, chattel paper, equipment, farm products, inventory, and negotiable documents
of title. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.530 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
3 See supra note 4 for a definition of "efficient" as used in this context.
3 In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must arrive at the sheriff's office with (1) the original
and the correct number of copies of a writ of execution (secured from a different office),
P.A.R.C.P. 3108(b); (2) envelopes addressed to all those who have to be served with
the writs with postage on them, id.; and (3) a "Writ of Execution Notice" which contains
advice to the defendant about exemptions and a form through which to claim them.
P.A.R.C.P. 3252(a). To have the clerk's office issue the Writ of Execution, the plaintiff
must also prepare a "Precipe for Writ of Execution." P.A.R.C.P. 3103, 3251. Each of
the forms must be properly completed by the plaintiff or his attorney; the execution
will not go forward without a complete and correct package.
1990]
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whereabouts and character of the debtor's personal property.
Acquiring that knowledge is expensive, requiring either inves-
tigation or discovery, both of which entail nonrecoverable ex-
penses. Under the new statutes there is no need to learn of the
existence and whereabouts of the judgment debtor's personal
property. None of the three new systems requires detailed spec-
ification of the personal property to be encumbered. Thus, under
these systems a judgment creditor might, without any investi-
gation, file a notice broadly describing the types of property to
be subjected to the lien and hope that the lien will stick to
something of value.
In addition, under the new procedures, one may often avoid
the litigation inevitable under traditional procedures. Often the
valuable forms of personal property are intangibles such as
patent or royalty rights, contract rights, judgments, and claims
not reduced to judgment. The law has long been confusing, at
best, as to whether such rights may be reached at all and, if so,
how one should proceed to execute on them. Thus, a judgment
creditor attempting to establish a claim to such property in most
states must begin by uncovering answers to these often-indeter-
minate legal questions. One needs answers at the beginning,
because the process of directing the sheriff may include per-
suading the sheriff that such property can be levied on and
instructing the sheriff on how the law specifies that levy be
done.
Moreover, once the sheriff acts, the legal questions may well
arise in litigation withthe judgment debtor about the propriety
of the levy. The judgment debtor will be provoked by the lien-
creating process of execution to litigate because that process
will have directly interfered with the debtor's possession and
enjoyment of the property. Thus, one can expect the debtor in
many cases to dispute uncertain legal questions if he can afford
litigation or to file a bankruptcy petition if he cannot. Either
way, unreimbursable legal costs escalate and dilute the value of
the judgment. Yet the judgment creditor's alternative-doing
nothing-is equally unattractive.
By contrast, in these three states, the judgment creditor's
position, whatever it will later turn out to be, can be preserved
just by filing the notice. The major question that arises at the
outset is in which office to file, a far less complex legal question




In addition, while the liens created under the new statutes are
probably as strong as execution liens both in and outside of
bankruptcy, 35 the notice itself is not so likely as actual execution
to provoke an immediate battle with the debtor.36 The new liens
are nonpossessory, leaving the judgment debtor in control of his
property. While the lien may eventually have a serious impact
on the judgment debtor's ability to finance his business, 37 the
initial provocation the debtor receives with a judgment lien filing
is far less than with actual execution.38
For the same reasons, the risk that the debtor will immediately
respond to a judgment lien notice with a bankruptcy petition
seems far less than the risk of such a debtor response to actual
execution. If this is true, it follows that the danger of losing
priority through a preference attack is lower under the new
systems than it was under the old: unless someone files a bank-
ruptcy petition within ninety days of the fixing of the lien, the
priority will be largely immune to preference law.39 Although
empirical study is needed to assess the interaction of these new
provisions with the bankruptcy system, one would expect far
more of these liens to survive bankruptcy than survive under
the present system.
In "efficiency" terms then, these new systems warrant high
praise. If one believes that the law should enhance what it means
to have a judgment, the new liens-even if they were weak and
subordinate to many other interests-surely would advance that
end. As the discussion will now show, the new state provisions
11 The priorities of the new liens against various competing claimants are discussed
in section III, B, 3 of this Article.
16 A judgment lien filed under the new provisions will be avoidable as a preference if
a bankruptcy petition is filed within 90 days of the lien filing. The judgment debtor may
not, however, be as directly concerned with who has priority to certain assets under
the new systems as he would have been under the old if he maintained possession and
use of the assets. Other creditors, of course, might be concerned and provoked by the
judgment lien filing to bring an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the judgment
debtor.
37 The debtor's ability to finance his business will be affected by priority rules for
Article 9 secured creditors. These priority rules are discussed in section III, B, 3 of this
Article.
1s Similarly, execution carries with it the risk that seizure of the debtor's property is
not legally warranted; there is thus always a possibility that execution will give a debtor
a later claim for wrongful execution if the creditor proceeded to seize property without
legal authority. A judgment lien, however, does not deprive the debtor of use of property
to the same extent as seizure; therefore, the risk that large damages will accrue following
wrongful use of procedure seems lower under the new procedures than under the old.
39 The bankruptcy law provides an extended period, however, for preferences to
"insiders" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V
1987). The provision is quoted infra note I 11.
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breed strong liens that give judgment creditors substantial prior-
ity over competing claimants.
3. Priority Implications: Contests with Those Competing for
Debtor Assets
A lien is primarily important to a creditor because it fixes, as
of a point in time, the creditor's claim to specific assets against
possible competing claims. These new statutes are significant
because they allow a judgment creditor to obtain a lien cheaply
and with fewer risks of debtor retaliation. But liens vary in
quality. For example, some are good against all competitors,
with or without actual notice, 40 others fail in various contests
with buyers, 41 and still others are specifically excluded from
protection under the Bankruptcy Code. 42
This section will first consider the protection these new state
statutes afford those who buy the encumbered property from
the debtor after the lien has been filed, and then will examine
comparable contests with various Article 9 secured creditors.
Part IV will consider contests with a bankruptcy trustee repre-
senting unsecured creditors.
a. Priority Contests with Buyers
Unlike transactions in land, sales of personal property have
not typically featured record searches. The absence of trust-
40 For example, a perfected security interest in industrial equipment is good against
buyers, later secured creditors, and, unless preferential, the trustee in bankruptcy. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-307, -312(5), -301(l)(b).
4, An example is New York's execution lien which arises at delivery of the writ of
execution to the sheriff but is not good against a buyer until the levy is actually made:
Where ajudgment creditor has delivered an execution to a sheriff, the judgment
creditor's rights ... are superior to the extent of the amount of the execution
to the rights of any transferee of the debt or property, except:
1. a transferee who acquired the debt or property for fair consideration
before it was levied upon; or
2. a transferee who acquired a debt or personal property not capable of
delivery for fair consideration after it was levied upon without knowledge of
the levy.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5202(a) (McKinney 1978). A security interest under the U.C.C.
will generally be subordinate to rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of business,
U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
42 Landlords' liens, for example, are avoidable by the trustee as "statutory liens." I I
U.S.C. § 545(3), (4) (1982).
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worthy records to accommodate movable personal property43
no doubt contributed to the commercial practice and general
legal presumption that possession constitutes the most reliable
indication of ownership. 44 Somewhat related to this central place
occupied by possession is the law's historic concern for the
bona fide purchaser, the innocent buyer who advances money
and takes real or personal property without knowledge that it is
subject to a competing claim.45
Under traditional execution systems, there is little need to
worry about persons who might buy without notice of the lien
created in the execution process. Many of these systems require
a seizure of the property from the judgment debtor to create a
lien,46 and the seizure itself puts any reasonable prospective
purchaser on actual notice. 47 In those places where the execu-
tion lien can arise before the debtor's property is actually
seized,48 states sometimes protect those who buy without notice
of the lien.49 In any event, the law requires seizure to follow
soon after delivery of a writ to the sheriff.50
41 The technology is probably available to record reliably the status of each individ-
ual's assets, real and personal. While privacy concerns probably will not constrain
private industry, these concerns will likely impede efforts to construct in the near future
a public file with such comprehensive information.
44 See generally Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983); cf. Helman, Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 83 COM. L.J. 25 (1978); Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible
Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements
to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988).
41 See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 19; Murray, Execution Lien Creditors Versus Bona
Fide Purchasers, Lenders and Other Execution Lien Creditors: Charles I and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 85 CoaM. L.J. 485 (1980).
4E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.110 (1983); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 697.710 (West
1987); IDAHO CODE § 11-201 (1979); Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.07; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-313
(1983 & Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-18-30 (1984); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-478 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.190 (West 1987).
47 Where the property cannot be carried away, the law has developed forms of
"constructive" seizure, such as immobilizing the property or tagging it, which, similarly,
can be expected to put third parties on notice. See, e.g., MD. R. Civ. P. 3-641, -642
(district court) & 2-641, -642 (circuit court); IOWA R. Civ. P. 260(b) (U.C.C. filing);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.13 (West 1987) (same).
4 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-66-112 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-52-111 (1973);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5081 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-307 (1981); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 651-41 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-111 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-34-9 (West 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 426.120 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 528:4 (Supp. 1986); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:17-
12 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5234(b) (McKinney 1978); PA. R. Civ. P.
3137 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 38-4-8 (1985).
49 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. 5202(a) (McKinney 1978) quoted supra in note 41.
" Many states specify a "return date" of 60 days after which the writ of execution
becomes void. States vary on when the 60-day period begins to run. See HAW. REv.
STAT. § 651-34 (1988) (from issuance); IDAHO CODE § 11-103 (Supp. 1987) (from "re-
ceipt"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2401(c) (1983) (from issuance); MINN. STAT. ANN.
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I The new statutes could undercut the policy reflected in the
older systems. Since the statutes create non-possessory liens in
the judgment debtor's personal property and because many pro-
spective buyers would not search public records before pur-
chasing the debtor's property,51 there is some chance that a
court will resolve any dispute in favor of an innocent buyer.5 2
Consequently, any legislative reform should resolve contests
that may arise between new judgment lien holders and later
buyers of the encumbered property.
Besides the importance of clearly resolving such contests,
there is the policy question of how to settle the priority issue.
On one side of the equation is the desire to strengthen the hand
of the judgment creditor by making the debtor's sale of the
encumbered property ineffective. On the other side is the desire
not to impede free transfers of personal property by requiring
buyers to check public files each time they buy personal prop-
erty. California and Connecticut have articulated their balancing
of these policies; Maine has not.
§ 550.05 (West 1988) (from "receipt"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-404 (1989) (from
"receipt"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21-040 (1985) (from "receipt"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-
4-9 (1978) (from "delivery"); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5230(c) (McKinney 1978) (from
"issuance"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-21-07 (Supp. 1987) (from "receipt"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2329.53 (Anderson 1981) (from "date"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 802 (1960)
("from the date thereof"); OR. REV. STAT. § 23.060 (1985) (from "receipt"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-18-41 (1984) (from "receipt" or levy); UTAH R. Civ. P. 69(c)
(from "receipt"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2681 (Supp. 1989) (from "date"); Wis. STAT.
§ 815.06 (1977) (from "receipt"); Wyo. STAT. § 1-17-339 (1977) (from "date"); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 474 (Supp. 1986) (from "receipt"). Rhode Island has the longest period of
one year. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-25-20, -21 (1985).
-i Because many buyers without actual notice will take property subject to prior
perfected Article 9 security interests, see U.C.C. § 9-307, at least some can be expected
to check the U.C.C. files prior to buying if the property is valuable enough and if they
have heard of Article 9.
52 There is a strong tradition in this direction. For example, the court in Lanterman
v. Luby, 114 A. 325, 327 (N.J. 1921), decreed that even where a relevant statute provided
that loss of the garage keeper's "control" did not result in loss of its lien, if the legislation
had "expressly included subsequent innocent purchasers for value without notice within
those against whom the right of seizure [upon loss of "control"] ... would exist (which
it did not), the act would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due
process of law .... " In the process of reaching this result, the court articulated a
strong policy of protection for bona fide purchasers:
Secret liens upon chattels are an obstruction and a menace to trade, and as
such are against the policy of the law. They attempt to contradict and to destroy
the universally accepted and natural, as well as legal badge of ownership of
chattels, which is possession. The law is most jealous in its protection of an
innocent purchaser of a chattel for value without notice, who has relied upon
possession as the badge of ownership.
Id. at 326. Accord In re Mission Marine Assoc., 633 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1980). See also
Radcliff Finance Corp. v. City Motor Sales, 323 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1959).
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California has been the most explicit in treating contests be-
tween buyers and holders of its new judgment lien and strikes
a policy balance comparable to that struck by the drafters of
Article 9 of the U.C.C. The legislation protects buyers in the
ordinary course of business as defined in U.C.C. § 9-307(1);
"[holders] to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly
negotiated within the meaning of Section 7-501 of the Commer-
cial Code"; and purchasers of chattel paper who give new value
and take possession of the chattel paper in the ordinary course
of business. Otherwise, the lien survives the sale of the
property.5 3
Like California, Connecticut articulates the policy choice by
specifying that its new judgment lien "shall be effective, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a similar security interest
under the provisions of [the Code]. 54 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) extends
protection to buyers "in the ordinary course of business," gen-
erally buyers of the debtor's inventory. 55 Buyers of encumbered
inventory from retailers are thus protected under both Con-
necticut and California's legislation. But those who buy encum-
bered property that the debtor does not sell "in the ordinary
course of business" apparently are not protected, even if they
buy without actual notice.16
In Maine, the outcome of a contest between a new judgment
lien holder and a later buyer of the property is unclear, since
Maine's legislation, unlike California's, is silent on the rights of
buyers. Moreover, unlike Connecticut, Maine does not specify
the nature of the lien created by the new filing procedures. This
5' CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.610 (West 1987).
'4 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-355a (West 1989).
51 "Buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith
and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course
from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind ....
U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
56 U.C.C. § 9-307(2) has been interpreted to offer protection only in transactions in
which a consumer is the seller and another consumer is the buyer. See J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24.15 (3d ed. 1988). The Connecticut leg-
islation excludes "consumerjudgments." See supra note 32. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) addresses
"future advances," which have no application in the judgment lien context because a
judgment lien holder does not make new advances to the debtor.
A different result could follow from § 9-306(2) which allows a purchaser to take free
of a security interest if disposition has been authorized by the secured party. While it
seems unlikely, allowing a debtor to remain in possession in Connecticut might be seen
as implied authorization to sell free of the lien.
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defect in the legislation requires resolution by a court or the
legislature.
If Maine's lien is interpreted as the equivalent of a security
interest, the results of the buyer-judgment creditor contest will
be the same as in the two other states. The later buyer will lose
unless she was a "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
falling within the protection of Code section 9-307(1). If, on the
other hand, the judgment creditor holds a lien similar to an
execution lien or other judicial lien, a court would have to decide
whether to charge buyers with record notice or extend bona fide
purchaser protection to all such buyers. Without Article 9 there
is no easy way to treat separately the "buyer in the ordinary
course of business" who clearly needs protection, 57 and thus a
court interpreting the lien in this way probably would feel com-
pelled to protect all buyers without actual notice, including those
who buy the judgment debtor's inventory.
b. Priority Contests with Article 9 Secured Parties
(1) Later secured parties. One readily expects Article 9 se-
cured parties to check the U.C.C. files before they make a
secured loan to most debtors.5 8 Checking the files is necessary
under the Code because the statute grants priority to the first
person to place a proper document-the financing statement-
in the files. 59 If a judgment creditor places a judgment lien in
the correct file, secured parties presumably will see it and take
any necessary protective action. It thus offends no principles of
notice to award a judgment lien holder priority over a later
secured party. And, indeed, it is difficult to justify why a secured
-7 Without "buyer in the ordinary course of business" protection, the judgment lien
holder would prevail against a buyer of an encumbered clothing store's shirt or of an
encumbered appliance store's microwave oven. In the context of modem commercial
law, such results would be extraordinary and unsound.
58 One exception is the retailer who makes loans to consumers to finance their pur-
chases. These seller-lenders take purchase money security interests in the goods they
sell. The Code makes their security interests perfected without filing and gives them
priority over competing security interests in the same collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
302(1)(d), -312(4). We can thus expect many such secured parties to operate largely
without concern for the files. But see infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
59 U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
[Vol. 27:1
19901 New Judgment Liens
lender with record notice of ajudgment lien should have priority
over the earlier party who already holds a judgment. 60
As a broad proposition, 61 all three states adhere to the Article
9 approach that the first person to file a correct document or to
otherwise perfect an interest covering the personal property will
prevail over later parties who have acquired an interest in the
same property.
The effect of this policy decision is significant: the holder of
a judgment can, by a proper filing, keep the debtor from using
the encumbered property for new financing because a new fin-
ancier will not be able to acquire priority higher than the judg-
ment lien holder's. The lien's ability to choke off the debtor's
new financing might, in at least some cases, influence the debtor
to pay the judgment without actual levy or garnishment.
As a baseline, Connecticut has incorporated a general first-
to-file-or-perfect rule by treating the judgment lien as an Article
9 security interest 62 for priority purposes. California's statute is
similar and somewhat more specific.63 In Maine, regardless of
whether the judgment lien is treated as a security interest or
judicial lien, a judgment creditor who files before a subsequent
secured party will prevail under the U.C.C., since a secured
60 Under the statutes, a secured party who checks the files on day 1, loans money on
day 2, and files her financing statement on day 4 will lose to a judgment lien holder who
files on day 3 just as she would lose to a secured party who had filed on day 3. While
the intervening judgment creditor and intervening secured party might be distinguished
on the basis that the former acted without actual reliance on a clear record on day 3
(she would have filed anyway), the statutes appear to make no distinctions in this case.
One might well argue that the prudent secured creditor, steeped in Article 9 practice,
should be expected to check the files on day 4 before advancing the cash, thereby
eliminating the risk of defeat by either an earlier secured party or a judgment lien holder.
The U.C.C. permits some later purchase-money lenders to defeat earlier secured parties.
The priorities of purchase-money lenders are discussed in the next section.
61 There are several exceptions to the general first-to-file rule which these states
embrace that will be developed infra at text accompanying note 65.
62 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-355a(c) (West Supp. 1989) states that its judgment
liens "shall be effective, in the same manner and to the same extent as a similar security
interest under [Article 9 of Connecticut's Commercial Code]." U.C.C. § 9-312(5) pro-
vides that the first person to file or perfect a security interest will prevail.
6 The California legislation provides, in part:
[P]riority between a judgment lien on personal property and a conflicting
security interest in the same property shall be determined according to this
subdivision. Conflicting interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. In the case of a judgment lien, priority dates from the time filing is
first made covering the personal property. In the case of a security interest,
priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the personal property
or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided
that there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 697.590(b) (West 1987).
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party loses to either an earlier lien creditor or to an earlier
secured party.64
(2) Earlier secured parties-priority as to future advances.
The first-in-time rule employed by all three states obviously
means that a judgment lien holder will be subordinate to a
secured party who already has filed a financing statement earlier.
But Article 9 allows a party already properly secured to make
additional later secured loans-future advances-without filing
additional financing statements. This innovation forced U.C.C.
policy makers to decide what priority the later advance should
have over interests arising after the original financing statement
but before the future advances .6 The Code's resolution distin-
guishes among intervening buyers,6 6 intervening lien creditors, 67
and intervening secured parties.6 8
Later secured parties make their loans after searching the files
and uncovering the earlier secured party's financing statement;
Code drafters determined that later parties should carry the risk
that the earlier party will make a future advance. In this situation
the Code provides that the future advance carries the same
priority as the original advance.6 9 While one might debate the
wisdom of a scheme that supplies the first secured party with a
monopoly on financing, 70 it is difficult to otherwise challenge the
fairness of the Code towards the second secured party. Given
the notice supplied by the files, the second party can choose
not to take on the risk and either walk away from the transaction
or seek a subordination agreement from the first secured party.
The situation is different when one obtains a judicial lien on
property already subject to a security interest. Unlike the later
secured party, a lien creditor cannot "walk away" from the
debtor on discovering the earlier party's financing statement.
64 U.C.C. §§ 9-301(I)(b), -312(5).
65 Courts have struggled with the question. See, e.g., Coin-O-Matic Service Co. v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966); James Talcott,
Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972). U.C.C. drafters have
addressed the question in at least three places in Article 9. See infra notes 66-68.
6 U.C.C. § 9-307(3) gives the creditor who made a future advance priority over an
intervening buyer unless the secured party knew of the sale or made the advance more
than 45 days after the sale.
67 U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
- U.C.C. § 9-312(7).
691d.
70 See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143, 1179-80 (1979).
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The lien is non-consensual, follows perhaps costly litigation,
and is an attempt to secure an old debt. Once such a lien is
asserted, it is much harder to justify a rule giving an earlier
secured party her original priority in all future advances. Code
drafters have recognized the fundamental difference between a
later secured party and a later lien creditor by crafting a special
rule giving future advances much more limited protection
against a later judicial lien. Article 9 gives the future advance
priority over the judicial lien only if the advance was made
within forty-five days after the lien or the secured party had no
notice of the lien.71
The three states seem to diverge on the question of what
priority to award a secured party's advances made after the
arrival of a new judgment lien. California has determined that
the proper analogy is that of the judicial lien holder under Article
9. The other two states are silent on the specific question, but
one can draw some tentative conclusions from their legislation.
California explicitly addresses the priority contest that will
occur between a judgment lien holder and an earlier secured
party who makes future advances. Section 697.590 provides in
part:
(f) A judgment lien that has attached to personal property
and that is also subordinate ... to a security interest in the
same personal property is subordinate.., only to the extent
that the security interest secures advances made before thejudgment lien attached or within 45 days thereafter or made
without knowledge of the judgment lien or pursuant to a
commitment entered into without knowledge of the judgment
lien .... [A] secured party shall be deemed not to have
knowledge of a judgment lien on personal property until
(1) the judgment creditor serves a copy of the notice ofjudgment lien on the secured party personally or by mail and
(2) the secured party has knowledge of the judgment lien on
personal property, as "knowledge" is defined in Section 1201
of the Commercial Code.72
71 The pertinent section provides:
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected
takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances
made before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made
without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without
knowledge of the lien.
U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
72 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 697.590(f) (West 1987).
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It should be easy to see the enormous effect a judgment lien in
California might have on continued secured financing from the
debtor's primary creditor. In revolving financing arrangements,
the same secured party will make additional loans to the debtor
as earlier loans are repaid or as the collateral changes. As dis-
cussed above, under Article 9 those future advances are pro-
tected against later secured parties to the same extent as the
original advance. By making its new lien a judicial lien, Califor-
nia has given its judgment creditors the power to destroy these
financing arrangements by simply filing the equivalent of a fi-
nancing statement, serving notice, and waiting the requisite
period.
If the lienholder gives the proper notice, 73 the original secured
party may safely make advances only for forty-five days after
the lien has been filed. After that, the advances will be subor-
dinate to the judgment lien. As a practical matter, one would
expect the secured party to refuse to make additional advances
after that point and, perhaps, to begin to terminate the financing
arrangements even sooner. This will obviously supply the judg-
ment creditor with immense leverage to effect payment of the
judgment without actual execution. 74
Connecticut has treated the issue less explicity and, perhaps,
differently. The Connecticut statute says only that its judgment
lien is to be treated as a "similar security interest."' 7 If the
legislature intended the judgment lien to be treated as a security
interest in this context, it made a policy choice very different
from California's, because the Code does not give priority to a
second secured party over the first secured party's later ad-
vances. 76 Therefore, if the Connecticut lien is treated as a se-
curity interest, the judgment holder will not be able to affect
the judgment debtor's ongoing financing arrangements. Thus,
the judgment holder in Connecticut will have a substantially
weaker lien than a similar party in California. Such an interpre-
tation would ignore fundamental differences between ajudgment
holder getting a lien to secure an old debt and a later secured
party considering whether to make a new loan. 77
7 Given the California notice provision, quoted supra at text accompanying note 72,
providing notice to secured parties of record should be part of a lawyer's standardized
process of obtaining a judgment lien following entry of judgment.
74 See also infra note 114.
75 The Connecticut statute is quoted supra at text accompanying note 26.
76 U.C.C. § 9-312(7). See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
17 See supra text accompanying note 70.
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Yet, perhaps, Connecticut determined that it was simply bad
policy to supply a party holding a judgment with this extraor-
dinary leverage over the debtor's continuing financing. Current
U.C.C. provisions were drafted against the backdrop of a tra-
ditional system which made a creditor's obtaining a lien on
personalty a rather extraordinary event. The new statutes may
make nonconsensual liens on personalty commonplace with un-
predictable effects on a local economy. Connecticut may have
decided that the stability of ongoing business financing was not
outweighed by the need to secure the payment of judgments
and may have intentionally resolved this policy question in favor
of the pre-existing secured party.
As will be seen in Part IV, the leverage given a judgment
holder is, ultimately, a deeply political question to which there
are no simple answers. The policy choices imbedded within
these new statutes inevitably require a delicate balancing of
competing interests. Given the actual language of the Connect-
icut statute and the uncertainty of its legislature's policy choice,
a strict reading of the statute to favor the pre-existing secured
party is probably appropriate until the legislature clarifies its
preference.
Maine's legislation is silent on how to treat the new lien in
this context. By specifying that the proper procedure is to file
an execution in the U.C.C. files and that the procedure "shall
create a lien,"' 78 the terminology suggests that the new lien
should be considered a judicial lien and not a security interest.
If that is the case, the results of this contest will be consistent
with those in California.
(3) Purchase money secured parties. One of the U.C.C.'s
innovations was to permit a party in a single transaction to
acquire a security interest in property the debtor would acquire
in the future, that is, in after-acquired property. Under the
Code's priority provisions, priority goes to the first party who
files a financing statement covering the collateral regardless of
when the collateral was acquired. 79 To this general rule the
U.C.C. makes an exception for purchase money secured par-
ties-generally, parties that finance the debtor's purchase of the
Maine's statute is quoted supra at text accompanying note 27.
U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
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collateral.80 If a secured party meets various Code requirements,
he can acquire priority in the new collateral over a pre-existing
secured party despite that party's earlier filing.8'
This strong policy of special priority for purchase money
secured parties has a long history. Before the arrival of the
Code, courts reached the Code result by manipulating property
concepts: the earlier creditor's security interest never attached
to the new collateral because the debtor had insufficient rights
in that collateral to grant a security interest to the first party.8 2
More recently, the policy has been justified on the basis that
the purchase money secured party has added specific value to
the debtor's assets, that this additional financing option is useful,
and that it harms no one to give the new secured party priority
as to that added value.8 3
When Article 9 was drafted, it was not necessary to give great
thought to whether a purchase money secured party should take
priority over a pre-existing lien creditor. This is because in most
states actual execution on specified, existing assets was the sole
method available to a judgment creditor for obtaining a lien on
personal property.8 4 The only after-acquired property that could
be reached was property the debtor acquired between the time
the judgment creditor delivered the writ of execution and the
time the sheriff levied. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) addresses the problem
in this way:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money
security interest before or within ten days after the debtor
receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority over
the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which
arise between the time the security interest attaches and the
time offiling.85
One might infer from the rule that if the lien arises either before
or at the same time as attachment of the security interest, the
lien creditor will win.
In the context of most state systems, the rule is consistent
with the strong policy of facilitating purchase money lending
90 U.C.C. § 9-107.81 U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), -312(4).
82 See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 wall.) 362, 364-65(1871).
83 See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 70, at 1164-78 (1979).
But see supra note 9.
85 U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (emphasis supplied).
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that is found in the Code. 86 The risk that a purchase money loan
will be defeated by an earlier lien creditor is very low as long
as the secured party files within 10 days. Many states require
actual levy in order to obtain a lien, 87 and levy cannot occur
until the debtor acquires some fights in the collateral. In those
states that permit an execution lien to arise on delivery of the
writ to the sheriff,88 the lien will typically be of short duration
and may not reach after-acquired property.
The situation is different under these new systems, of course,
because the liens are easier to get, last longer, and reach after-
acquired property. Like security interests, the liens will arise
when the debtor gets fights in the new collateral, that is, at the
same time the purchase money security interest attaches. 89 Un-
der a strict reading of current Code language that addresses the
contest between the lien creditor and purchase money secured
party,90 the new liens might defeat many purchase money se-
cured parties and thus could pose a substantial risk to purchase
money lending.
On the other hand, if one wished to further strengthen the
hand of the judgment creditor, one could give these liens priority
over later purchase money lenders. The effect would be to force
sellers and others who finance purchases to check the files
before lending and to decline purchase money loans if the debt-
or's personal property is found to be encumbered with a judg-
ment lien. Policy makers should weigh the probable economic
costs of forcing purchase money lenders to check files prior to
lending9 against the benefits of further strengthening the judg-
ment creditor's hand.
- U.C.C. §§ 9-312(4), -313(4)(a), and -314 are all illustrations of the Code policy that
a person who finances the debtor's acquisition of new collateral ought to have priority
as to that collateral over pre-existing secured parties or encumbrancers.
81 See supra note 46.
Is See supra note 48.
89 A security interest can attach no earlier than the time the debtor acquires "rights
in the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
90 The provision is set out supra at text accompanying note 85.
91 Where the contest is between a purchase money secured party and another secured
party, Article 9 has resolved this policy issue in favor of the purchase money party.
U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
Except in the case of financing a debtor's acquisition of inventory, a purchase money
financier can be assured of priority without checking the U.C.C. files prior to lending.
If the Code requirements are met, the later purchase money lender will have priority
regardless of what she would have found in the files.
A policy maker might ask whether a judgment lienholder who has engaged in litigation
to collect an old debt should be treated better than a secured party who, while not owed
an old debt, is induced to lend money by the security her purchase money security
interest will provide.
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Because Article 9 was drafted in an era devoid of judgment
liens on personal property, one can only speculate how its draf-
ters would have treated the contest between a judgment lien-
holder and a later purchase money secured party. But the strong
policy in the Code of protecting a purchase money lender by
awarding priority over a pre-existing lienholder 92 suggests that
the drafters probably would have protected the purchase money
lender in this context as well.
California is the most explicit in determining the contest be-
tween a judgment lien holder and a later purchase money lender.
Its legislature drafted a specific provision which favors the pur-
chase money lender by providing:
A purchase money security interest has priority over a con-
flicting judgment lien on the same personal property or its
proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected
at the time the judgment debtor receives possession of the
personal property or within 10 days thereafter.93
A court in Connecticut, treating its lien as a similar security
interest, 94 could reach a result similar to California's by ruling
that the contest is determined by the U.C.C. provisions that
resolve priority contests95 between holders of security interests
and later purchase money lenders. 96
9 See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
9' CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.590(d) (West 1987).
94 The Connecticut statute is quoted supra at text accompanying note 26.
95 U.C.C. § 9-312(4) provides:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds
if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor
receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
96 U.C.C. § 9-312(3) establishes far more specific requirements that must be met before
a purchase money lender on inventory can get priority over a pre-existing security
interest in inventory. Among other things, the rule requires that the purchase money
lender's security interest be perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the
inventory and that the purchase money lender notify the earlier secured party before
the later lender files. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3)(a), -312(3)(b). Since the Connecticut judgment
lien reaches the judgment debtor's inventory, if U.C.C. § 9-312(3) is applied in the
judgment lien context, the practical effect might well be to seriously impede ajudgment
debtor's acquisitions of new inventory through purchase money loans. On encountering
the judgment lien within the files, the new lender might well reconsider making the loan.
Or, on receiving the required notification from the purchase money lender, the judgment
lien creditor might be prompted to begin execution proceedings.
While this result seems inoffensive as a policy matter, it differs from the result the
California legislature mandated, because California made no distinctions between pur-
chase money lenders on inventory and others. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 697.590(e) (West 1987), which resolves a circular priority problem created by its
judgment lien priority provision in the inventory financing setting.
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By failing to define the nature of its lien or to specify priority
rules, 97 the Maine legislature left the contest between ajudgment
lien holder and a later purchase money lender unsettled. If the
lien is treated like a judicial lien, the U.C.C. rule 98 that resolves
contests between holders of judicial liens and later purchase
money secured parties will apply, and a strict reading of that
rule could defeat a purchase money secured party who filed
after the judgment lien was in place. Such a result would, be at
odds with the U.C.C. policy of protecting purchase money
lenders.
Moreover, if a court ruled that a purchase money lender must
check the files before lending to protect against earlier judgment
liens, it would undermine the U.C.C. rule by forcing a pre-
transaction file check in a situation where the Code drafters
thought it unnecessary. Maine's legislation ought to be clarified
on this point. By the same token, because a state has the ca-
pacity through these liens to undermine purchase money lend-
ing, U.C.C. policy makers might well consider a revision to the
Code to accommodate this new kind of judicial lien. 99
IV. IMPACT OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE LARGER SYSTEM
A. Contests Between Lien Holders and Unsecured Creditors:
Implications for Bankruptcy
It is a basic tenet of our debtor-creditor system that unsecured
creditors have no claims to specific assets. They must them-
selves secure judgments on their claims and obtain liens before
they are able to assert priority in specific assets. Consequently,
there is no real contest between an ordinary unsecured creditor
and any lien holder: within the state systems, a lien holder will
defeat most creditors who do not have liens.
97 The Maine legislation is quoted supra at text accompanying note 27.
91 U.C.C. § 9-301(2) is quoted supra at text accompanying note 85.
99 One final issue which policy makers might want to consider is the extent to which
these new liens in a few jurisdictions affect desired uniformity of the U.C.C. The Code
was drafted before such liens were possible and against a backdrop of the inefficient
creditor enforcement system. As the text suggests, the new liens interact with secured
lending in a different way than did execution liens under older systems. Given the major
change these new statutes bring and given the state-to-state variation even in the new
provisions, have we begun injecting further complexity into our basic commercial
legislation whose strongest attribute is supposed uniformity?
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Unsecured creditors are, however, represented by the trustee
in bankruptcy and collectively get what is left of the debtor's
assets after the claims of valid lien holders have been satisfied.
This competition for the debtor's limited assets combined with
the bankruptcy law's recognition of state-created liens' 00 make
bankruptcy,, in many respects, a contest between secured and
unsecured creditors. Because the debtor's finite assets must be
divided among secured and unsecured claims, any state law that
creates new liens that are enforceable in bankruptcy carries with
it the potential of upsetting the current balance between secured
and unsecured creditors. Although there may be nothing sac-
rosanct about the present balance, when evaluating the new
provisions, policymakers may want to consider whether the new
judgment lien provisions alter the current distribution. Some
policymakers may consider an altered distribution in bankruptcy
to be an undesirable side effect of the "efficiency" brought about
by the new statutes.
The present balance of distribution amongst claimants within
the bankruptcy process will remain undisturbed if the Bank-
ruptcy Code enables trustees to avoid the new liens. It is, after
all, federal bankruptcy law's deference to state law-created liens
and security interests that ties the welfare of lien creditors to
the claims of unsecured claimants, and Congress certainly has
the power to make such liens ineffective in bankruptcy. 101 Trust-
ees will probably be unable to avoid the new liens, however,
because under current law, any attack on the liens is likely to
fail.
The Bankruptcy Code's strong arm provision' 0 gives the
trustee the power, as of the date of the bankruptcy filing, of a
"creditor on a simple contract [with a] ... judicial lien."' 03 The
trustee's challenge under this strong arm power, however, will
probably fail. In all three states, an earlier filed lien will defeat
a later lien.'0 4 Therefore, a person (here read trustee) with a
100 This recognition seems unlikely to be constitutionally based. See Rogers, The
Impairment of Secured Creditor's Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship
Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L. REv. 973
(1983).
lo Congress, for example, made liens "for rent" and "of distress for rent" avoidable
as a class in bankruptcy. II U.S.C. § 545(3)-(4) (1982).
1- 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1987).
103 Id.
104 The same rule that applies to contests between judgment lien holders and later
secured parties will apply to later lien holders as well and thereby defeat the trustee.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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judicial lien arising after the judgment lien will be subordinate.
The trustee's other strong arm powers would probably not fare
any better. 105
An attack on these liens as statutory liens under Code section
545(2)106 also seems unlikely to succeed. Section 101(47) of the
Code defines a statutory lien, in part, as a "lien arising solely
by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions
. . . , but does not include security interest or judicial lien. 10 7
The Code in turn defines judicial lien as a "lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable pro-
cess or proceeding."10 8 Since the new judgment liens are "ob-
tained by judgment," they appear to be judicial liens rather than
statutory liens under the Bankruptcy Code's definitions. More-
over, even if one gets beyond these definitional problems, avoid-
able statutory liens must fail the bona fide purchaser 0 9 test found
in section 545(2). Such failure seems unlikely, because judgment
liens are valid against later secured parties-purchasers under
the Bankruptcy Code's definitions.110
Like all other liens and security interests, judgment liens on
personal property will be subject to attack as preferences, pro-
105 Congress also gave the trustee the rights and powers of:
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an
execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether
or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains
the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time
of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 1987).
106 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) permits the trustee to:
avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent that
such lien-
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the
case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of
the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
107 11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (Supp. V 1987).
10 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. V 1987).
109 See supra note 106 for the text of 11 U.S.C. § 545(2), which describes the circum-
stances under which a statutory lien may be avoided. "Purchaser" is defined in the Code
as "transferee of a voluntary transfer," 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. V 1987), which would
include lenders who take security interests as well as buyers.
110 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. V 1987). A "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
may be able to defeat the liens, see supra text accompanying notes 53-57, but this is a
far narrower class of buyers than "bona fide purchaser" as defined in the Bankruptcy
Code.
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vided they meet the requirements of section 547.111 But as sug-
gested earlier, since fixing these liens does not deprive the
debtor of possession of personalty as does execution, a precip-
itous bankruptcy filing may be less likely as a matter of course.
A debtor receiving notice of a judgment lien is unlikely to have
the same reaction as, for example, a debtor whose property has
just been seized by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment.
Moreover, Connecticut,112 unlike Maine," 3 does not explicitly
require the judgment creditor to notify the debtor that she has
filed her judgment lien notice. In some cases this means that
the debtor may not discover the lien soon enough to file a
bankruptcy petition and capture the encumbrance within the
statutory preference period. In short, it seems that these liens
are less likely to be avoided as preferences than the execution
liens which these judgment liens have partly displaced." 4
Since it is likely that these liens will be enforceable in bank-
ruptcy, the present distributional balance between secured and
unsecured creditors may be significantly altered. Claimants in
t This section will apply only if there is a:
"transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-355a (West Supp. 1989).
113 Maine's provision specifies that:
[a] lien created by this section shall become void with respect to the right, title
and interest of any particular judgment debtor, unless the judgment creditor
notifies the judgment debtor by certified or registered mail sent to his last
known address on or before 20 days after filing or recording of the existence
of the lien.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4651 (Supp. 1988). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.560
(West 1987) also requires service of the notice of the judgment lien on the judgment
debtor "at any time of filing . . . or promptly thereafter." Yet the notice requirement
may be negated by the fact that the Code also provides that "[the failure to comply
with this requirement does not affect the validity of the judgment lien." Id.
,,4 A debtor in a revolving financing arrangement, see supra text accompanying note
74, could avoid the lien if it interfered with the financing arrangements but, in this case,
filing a bankruptcy petition to do so might be a cure worse than the disease.
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these three states may well file complaints and obtain default
judgments because a claim to specific assets can so easily follow
such a process. Thus, as suggested earlier,15 these cheaper and
more efficient procedures for obtaining liens on personalty will
probably result in more liens on personalty.
In addition, one can expect the new judgment liens to reach
beyond narrow categories of property. Given the low expense
and low risk of obtaining these judgment liens, judgment holders
are unlikely to investigate a debtor's assets and assert interests
only in the limited categories of personal property that they find.
Rather, their lawyers are apt to mass produce judgment lien
documents to assert priority in all personal property, 116 thereby
making expensive individual treatment unnecessary.
All of this means that in these states more debtors who enter
bankruptcy should enter with their property already encum-
bered by these new liens. States that have enacted these systems
have, in short, set up a legal regime that may redistribute prop-
erty from unsecured claimants to the new lien holders in
bankruptcy. " 7
These distributional consequences may be worse for some
unsecured creditors than for others. The impact of these new
liens will be felt only by those who would have been paid
something in bankruptcy had the liens not been in effect. The
most likely classes of unsecured creditors to be affected in
bankruptcy, therefore, are those near the top of the detailed
federal priority scheme. 1 8 Employees, pension plans, taxing
authorities, and other priority claimants, therefore, have more
to fear than others from a reallocation of assets from unsecured
to secured creditors in bankruptcy.
From the perspective of both policy makers and all unsecured
bankruptcy claimants, perhaps the most important group of un-
115 See supra text accompanying note 33.
116 The lawyers' forms will likely assert claims to all the debtor's personal property,
including after-acquired property, in words which meet the then-current U.C.C. test for
specificity within a financing statement. Current cases hold descriptions such as "all
assets" as inadequate and descriptions in U.C.C.-defined categories as adequate. See
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 56, § 22-18, at 1040-44. It seems likely that the
forms will simply list all U.C.C.-defined categories of collateral.
117 Yet these results may not come to pass. The degree of reallocation from unsecured
to judgment lien claimants will depend on the amount of unencumbered assets that
would have been available for distribution absent the new provisions. If, for example,
most California judgment debtors' assets are fully encumbered to begin with, the newjudgment liens will have little impact on unsecured creditors in any event.
118 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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secured creditors is the first priority class'1 9 of administrative
claimants, including trustees who are paid by the estate to pre-
serve the assets for the benefit of all unsecured creditors and to
avoid liens, preferences, and other transfers. Since much of the
bankruptcy system's operation is financed by administrative
expenses, the new liens have the potential of draining money
away from the bankruptcy system itself. If the new liens result
in more cases where there are insufficient unencumbered assets
to pay a private bankruptcy trustee, the system may have to
rely on federal officials to oversee these no-asset bankruptcy
cases that would have been asset cases under the traditional
system. 120 The impact such a shift in responsibility would have
on the federal budget and the taxpayer is uncertain but could
be substantial.
Since the new judgment lien provisions are theoretically avail-
able to all unsecured creditors, it could be said that neither
priority nor non-priority unsecured creditors have cause to com-
plain. But for many creditors, the theoretical ability to use the
new provisions is of little solace and the possibility of adjusting
credit practices in light of the new provisions is limited. Em-
ployees, for example, will be unable to get judgments for their
wages in time to avail themselves of the new provisions and will
be unlikely to get security interests for their unpaid wages.12 1
Tort creditors do not engage in consensual credit transactions
and do not decide for themselves whether to extend credit.
Buyers of goods who have already paid for them can be creditors
on warranty claims, but claims for breach of warranty arise
after the warranty has been extended. 2 2 Small or legally unso-
phisticated creditors may be unable to justify the expense of
getting the judgment necessary to deploy the new procedures.
And, administrative expense claimants only begin their work
when most of the estate's assets are already spoken for.
19 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(I) (1982).
120 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(2) (1982).
121 See 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 676, at 209:
Why must the employee give "credit" and the employer not? Why must the
employee carry the risk of getting nothing for his labor, while the employer
does not carry the risk of getting no labor for his money? The answer is that
such is the almost universal custom of men.
Unsecured employee claims may not, however, be a great problem in fact. One com-
mentator maintains that numbers of wage claims in bankruptcy are very low, because
employers in financial trouble want least to precipitate trouble from their employees,
See Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (1986).
122 See Left, supra note 3, at 20. But cf. Buckley, supra note 121, at 1393, 1407.
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Thus, while the new judgment lien provisions are technically
available to everyone, they might actually tend to favor larger
creditors and those in businesses that have reduced the unit
costs of obtaining judgments. Put another way, the main bene-
ficiaries of these provisions may be those that, as an empirical
matter, get judgments most easily. The losers may be those who
have the most difficulty obtaining judgments on their claims.
Ordinarily, questions of priority among various classes of
creditors occupy a prime position in public policy debates in
the debtor-creditor field. The set of priorities within the Bank-
ruptcy Code 2 1 was itself the product of long deliberation. Sim-
ilar priority issues in the new judgment lien statutes, however,
have engendered little or no political or policy debate despite
the fact that some creditors will be much better than others at
obtaining judgments. Whether differences in judgment-getting
potential stem from the nature of the underlying claims (e.g.,
loan defaults versus personal injury), legal sophistication, access
to legal resources, or other factors, in these states some credi-
tors will enjoy priority over other state claimants and even over
priority claimants in bankruptcy. Who the privileged creditors
are is an empirical question; however, it seems nearly certain
that they are not employees claiming wages, tort claimants,
consumers with warranty claims, or persons without routine
access to the resources required to get ajudgment. This de facto
subordination of whole classes of creditors not only entails a
normative decision about which creditors are more deserving of
recovery, it may also alter the system that supplies creditors
with incentives to discover hidden debtor assets.
Under the traditional systems which award priority only to
creditors who locate and seize property, claimants have a pow-
erful incentive (i.e., priority) to spend money in a search for a
judgment debtor's hidden personal property. Such investigatory
activity may be useful, since it improves the lot of creditors
generally by increasing the total assets available for collection.
Therefore, as a policy matter at the state and federal level, one
might appropriately reward with priority those claimants who
engage in the activity of uncovering debtors' hidden assets,
regardless of the underlying nature of their claims.
By contrast, the new systems provoke no similar investigatory
activity, because it is unnecessary to locate a judgment debtor's
3 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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property in order to obtain priority over it. Getting a judgment
and filing a document are all that are necessary to fix priority in
the debtor's assets, whatever they happen to be. Once someone
has filed for a judgment lien, remaining claimants have no in-
centive to engage in investigatory activity, since chances are
they will lose to the earlier-filed judgment lien holder, even if
they locate hidden assets and levy on them. 24 Policy makers
should question whether the simple activity of getting a judg-
ment and filing a document is an activity that justifies the award
of priority regardless of the merits of the claim.
What is most troublesome is that these questions of priority
may not have been raised when these new statutes were con-
sidered. State policy makers appraising the new provisions and
federal policy makers contemplating changes to the bankruptcy
laws should consider the significant changes that the judgment
lien statutes may create within the preexisting priority system
before advising adoption of these more "efficient" procedures.
The impact on the bankruptcy process may be yet more subtle
and difficult to quantify. One can hypothesize, for example, that
fewer business debtors will have the unencumbered assets that
make the bankruptcy process worthwhile for trustees and un-
secured claimants in the first place. Many such debtors may
avoid bankruptcy altogether in these states and simply abandon
their property to the lien holders. And while large numbers of
the new liens may not make Chapter 11 reorganizations disap-
pear, -the liens could make it more difficult for a debtor, to
reorganize than it was before.125 •
If this is the case, is the diminished bankruptcy activity that
will follow desirable? Does or should federal policy protect the
bankruptcy process and its federal priority claimants from state
procedures that, on their face, are available to all yet tend to
favor some over others? 126 If the new judgment lien provisions
124 Judgment liens on real property suffer from the same sorts of problems and might
well be attacked on the same basis. They might be distinguishable from judgment liens
on personal property, because real property may be harder for a debtor to conceal. In
addition, there may well be less unencumbered real property in difficult cases than
unencumbered personal property.
21 A reorganizing debtor has far less latitude when dealing with holders of "secured
claims" under the Bankruptcy Code than with "unsecured claims." See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987). If enforceable in bankruptcy, a new judgment lien would
qualify as a "secured claim." 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) (1982), 101(33) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
'26 The question whether the bankruptcy law should, as a matter of policy, affect a
distribution of assets different from that mandated by state law has received recent
scholarly attention. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 775 (1987);
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are enacted by other states, these questions may become more
pressing.
B. Effects on Debtor Protection-Direct Impact on
Exemptions
Exemption provisions generally provide that some portion of
the debtor's property is not available to creditors to satisfy their
judgments. These provisions vary immensely from state to state
but generally arise from a concern that the judgment debtor not
be reduced to total destitution and dependency through the
operation of the execution statutes. All exemption provisions
reflect a general legislative judgment that preserving some
amount or types of debtor property is more important, for one
or more reasons, than allowing the collection of debts from that
property. Execution statutes typically contain procedures
through which a debtor can raise an exemption claim and
through which, if the claim is sustained, the property cannot be
reached by the execution.
The new liens will probably affect the protection afforded
debtors by exemption statutes because they handle exemption
rights differently from the old statutes. Connecticut has
apparently 127 tried to keep these provisions from having an im-
pact on consumers by excluding consumer judgments from the
reach of these provisions. 128 Nonetheless, since the legislation
treats the lien as a security interest, 129 if the lien were to reach
the property of consumers it could have a devastating impact,
because the law typically regards a debtor's exemption rights
as subordinate to the rights of one possessing a security
interest. 130
Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
CHi. L. REV. 815 (1987).
127 See supra note 32.
'2 The Connecticut legislation is quoted supra at text accompanying note 26.
129 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-355a(c) (Supp. 1988).
130 In most states, an exemption will be invalid against one holding a security interest
in the exempt personal property. See generally Haines, Security Interests in Exempt
Personalty: Toward Safeguarding Basic Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
215 (1981).
This rule has not been lost on creditors. It has been an open secret for some time
that creditors could simply and easily gain access to exempt property by getting the
debtor to give a security interest in it. And this was so despite a near-universal rule
that executory waivers of exemption rights were ineffective. Id.
The situation has been remedied somewhat by a provision in the Bankruptcy Code
making many such security interests ineffective against exempt property, 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(2) (1982), and by a similar rule enacted by the Federal Trade Commission to
apply outside the bankruptcy context. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(2) (1984).
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The Connecticut legislation is explicit in treating its lien as a
security interest and, without substantial judicial counterspin,
the lien could defeat a judgment debtor's exemption rights in
the targeted property. Yet, in Connecticut one cannot obtain
such a lien based on a consumer judgment. The question, then,
is whether there are nonconsumer judgments that could be en-
tered against those for whom exemption rights might be impor-
tant. There may well be.131
Instead of excluding consumer judgments from the scope of
its judgment lien legislation, California has limited its liens to
certain categories of property. The legislation specifies that judg-
ment liens can be acquired against accounts receivable, chattel
paper, equipment (not including motor vehicles), farm products,
inventory, and negotiable documents of title. 132 By its terms, the
California legislation excludes virtually all types of property its
exemption statutes protect. One exception, however, is the Cal-
ifornia exemption for "personal property used in trade, business,
or profession," the traditional tools-of-the-trade exemption,
which is limited in California to a relatively generous value of
$2500.133 Much of a small business debtor's business equipment
fits this common exemption, thereby raising a question whether
the judgment lien is subordinate to this exemption right.
The California statutes do not explicitly answer this ques-
tion. 134 However, since the legislation tends to treat its new lien
as a judgment lien in most respects and not as a security interest,
a sensible resolution is that the lien is inferior to the exemption
rights as are more traditional judgment liens elsewhere.
Unlike the statutes of Connecticut and California, Maine's
provision is explicit on the status of exemption rights. The lien
only covers those types of "[real and] personal property which
,3' Recently completed research confirms what many practitioners are already aware
of: a substantial number of individual bankruptcies involve small businesses in which
the business assets and the personal assets of the principal are hopelessly intertwined.
See generally T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOY, As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS 108-27 (1989). Whether because debtors have given personal guarantees for
the debts of their corporations or because their businesses lack a corporate form to
shield their personal assets, creditors might seek potentially exempt personal assets for
business-related debts.
132 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.530(a), (d)(1) (West 1987).
"1 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.060 (West 1987).
Im But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.010(a) (West 1987), which provides, in part,
that "[tihe exemptions provided by this chapter... apply to all procedures for enforce-
ment of a money judgment." The language suggests that the lien will be subordinate to
the debtor's exemption rights.
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are not exempt from attachment and execution. ' 135 The statute
thus will have no direct effect on debtors' exemption rights.
C. Other System-Wide Impact: "Efficient" Reconsidered 36
1. Indirect Impact on Exemptions
As suggested earlier, some debtors retain non-exempt prop-
erty simply because for the creditor, the cost of attempting to
collect is too great, and the possibility of success in collection
efforts is too uncertain. 37 Any realistic assessment of the debtor
defenses provided by a collection system ought to take account
of this shielding of debtor assets, whether or not the legislature
deliberately intended such debtor protection. Such protection,
the direct product of collection system inefficiencies, may well
be more important to debtors than exemption statutes. 38
While it is highly unlikely that any legislature intended to
bestow debtor protection through system inefficiencies, it does
not follow that legislatures enacted substantive debtor protec-
tions within the collection system without regard to system
inefficiencies. For instance, system inefficiency may have af-
fected past legislative judgment on the appropriate substance of
its exemption provisions. Similarly, an inefficient collection sys-
tem may have made it less necessary to develop effective pro-
cedures for asserting exemption claims. Indeed, it appears that
contemporary efforts to reduce system inefficiency may raise
the same political question of wealth distribution that efforts to
reduce the substance of exemption provisions themselves do.
Exemption statutes were generally enacted against the back-
drop of local law, including typically inefficient collection sys-
35 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4651(A) (Supp. 1986).
136 See generally Balkin, supra note 5, at 1477-78 (assailing a narrow "efficiency"
analysis conducted by some proponents of law and economics as ultimately misleading
and political in content).
137 Voluntary bankruptcy and the accompanying power to avoid a levy as a preference
inject a substantial risk of failure into any execution. As discussed earlier, the new
judgment lien statutes will probably create liens more likely to survive bankruptcy. If
so, the bankruptcy risk within the collection system will have been lowered by the new
statutes.
236 Surely this would be the effect in a state like Pennsylvania where the exemption
statutes protect only $300 of personal property plus a few odd miscellaneous items such
as sewing machines. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8123-8124 (Purdon 1982).
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tems 1 39 In enacting exemptions, legislatures were called on to
assess the needs of their debtors and their assessments of these
needs played a part in molding the exemption legislation. But
surely legislatures could not have made these assessments in a
vacuum. Evidence of debtor needs-indeed, the motivation to
consider exemption reform at all-must come primarily from
debtor groups within the political process. To some extent, at
least, the preexisting collection system played a part in law-
makers' perception and assessment of debtor need; an exemp-
tion package designed for a procedurally inefficient system
might look very different from one designed for an efficient one.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the first question a
legislature might consider in connection with new judgment lien
legislation is whether preexisting exemption provisions are sub-
stantively adequate in light of a more efficient collection regime.
Second, in a related vein, traditional exemption statutes may
have been premised on the existence of only two distinct groups
of debtors: consumer debtors who needed exemptions, and busi-
ness debtors who did not need them. 140 New data suggest that
we might consider the small entrepreneurs who commingle busi-
ness and personal assets and finances as a third group, one that
has a disproportionately high rate of bankruptcy filings.1 4 , A
more efficient collection regime directed primarily at business
debtors could exacerbate the exemption-related problems this
third group might have. A policy maker might well conclude
that in light of these research findings, this third group should
be getting more exemption protection at the state level,142 and
that making the collection system more efficient without ad-
dressing exemption protection will simply make matters
worse. 143
,39 California reconsidered its exemption provisions at the time it created its new
judgment lien provisions. As the text makes clear, this comprehensive approach is
desirable because of the interrelated nature of the collection process and exemption
protection.
140 See T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 131, at 119-20,
141 See id. at 111-12.
142 For example, given that this type of debtor uses her business (and its assets) to
produce income and sustenance, might a state want to reconsider the breadth or size
of its "tools-of-the-trade" exemption so that an executing creditor cannot through ex-
ecution deprive the judgment debtor of her very livelihood by seizing nearly all the
business assets?
The point here is not to advocate any particular resolution of the issue but rather to
suggest that exemption protection may have been developed in a faulty conceptual
environment.
,41 Cf. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 131, at 121:
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A second possible effect of more efficient procedure is an
increased number of debtor demands on the exemption system.
Indeed, exemption provisions and procedural inefficiency work
in tandem in a given system to dispense protection to debtors.
Reducing the costs of formal collection processes may well
increase their use. 44 If that is the case, exemption statutes will
be pressed into service more often than they were before. But
will a state's procedures for claiming exemption protection still
be suitable in a more aggressive collection environment? Even
if the exemption procedures are theoretically adequate, will the
state's judicial apparatus for determining exemption-related is-
sues be sufficient to handle an increased volume of exemption
litigation? Finally, if there are extra burdens imposed on the
judicial system, who will pay for them-debtors and creditors,
or taxpayers? These are all questions a legislature might also
consider in advance of improving collection system efficiency.
Third, an increase in the efficiency of collection will result in
the decline of debtor protection which inefficient collection pro-
cedures, much like exemption provisions themselves, provide.
Whether one labels it "corrective legislation" or "efficient pro-
cedure," it is likely that the reduction of collection process
inefficiency results in a transfer of wealth from debtors to cred-
itors.145 In other words, the promotion of efficiency has distri-
[I]f we really are a capitalist country, committed to the notion that people
should try to start their own businesses and nurture them into Apple Computers
or Tandy Electronics, just how harshly should we treat the entrepreneurs in
bankruptcy? The high-risk nature of entrepreneurship means, in effect, that
bankruptcy policy is another part of small business policy. It seems to us that
some systematic attention to the problem of small business should be placed
on the agenda of bankruptcy policymakers.
One need merely to add that the issue also should be on the agenda of any state
legislature considering a more "efficient" collection system.
4 Whitford, supra note 16, at 1097-98. Professor Leff suggests that in a perfect
system, reducing the costs of coercive collection merely shifts the settlement value of
a claim in the direction of full payment of the amount of the claim and does not
necessarily increase the use of formal procedures. Leff, supra note 3, at 38-40. In
theory, what may happen under a less costly collection system is a transition period of
greater use of the formal process until information about its availability is disseminated.
See generally id. at 38-46. Without empirical work, we cannot really know how-or
for how long-less costly collection procedures will affect the rate at which creditors
use formal collection measures.
'45 While this is an empirical question, it seems likely that whether or not creditors
will recover a larger portion of outstanding debt under a more efficient collection system
depends on (among other things) whether (1) there are available assets not now being
collected and whether (2) creditors will exert the same collection efforts under a more
efficient system in order to get larger recoveries. Creditors could also respond to a more
efficient collection system by exerting less effort to recover the same portion of out-
standing debt; they would have to respond this way if they were currently collecting all
available assets from defaulting debtors.
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butional consequences. Thus, efficiency is not a politically neu-
tral, but rather a politically loaded, proposition.
2. Impact on the Informal Collection System
It is widely known that debts are generally collected without
resort to the legal process. With respect to the consumer system,
for instance, it was stated in 1979:
The single most important fact about the consumer credit
collection system is that, of the delinquent debts that are
ultimately paid, the vast majority are collected through "con-
sensual" debtor payments made after some kind of bargain-
ing between creditor and debtor, and on occasion between
the debtor's various creditors as well. Only a small percent-
age of delinquent debts are ever paid as a direct result of
coercive execution. 46
One reason for preferring the informal system is that the costs
of using the formal collection system are so great. 147
a. Distributional Impact
(1) Improved settlement value of judgments. The expense
creditors must sustain in coercive collection tends to affect the
settlements that creditors and debtors negotiate within the in-
formal system. The debtor's leverage within the informal pro-
cess depends, in part, on the extra expense she can force the
creditor to sustain through formal means. 48 Conversely, the
It seems doubtful that creditors will reduce their collection efforts in response to a
more efficient collection regime; the text proceeds on the more likely assumption that
creditors do not currently collect all available property from defaulting debtors because
of system inefficiencies and that they will continue to invest the same resources in
collection activities in a more efficient system as they did before.
Of course, an economist might argue that enhancing collection efficiency will produce
a net gain for the economy, which will trickle down to everyone and, as a result, is a
good that all should embrace, both debtors and creditors. Moreover, an economic
analysis does not purport to comment on the distributional fairness of enhanced effi-
ciency. The point here is not to dispute the analysis but merely to observe: (1) that it
is nearly certain that the creditor class will be the initial beneficiaries of the newly
achieved efficiency; (2) that it seems fairly certain that the debtor class will directly
finance of some gains in efficiency that the new statutes yield (assuming that creditors
maintain the same level of collection activity); and (3) that it is uncertain how and
whether the "newly acquired" wealth will trickle down from the creditor class to the
broader population.
146 Whitford, supra note 16, at 1051.
14 See Whitford, supra note 16, at 1053-55; Leff, supra note 3, at 5-18.
148 See Leff, supra note 3, at 5-10.
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creditor's attraction to an offer of less-than-full payment de-
pends in part on the added unrecoverable expenses and risk of
coercive collection. If the new judgment lien provisions shift
the leverage of one group or the other within the process, that
shift will have economic consequences for both groups. Two
examples from the earlier discussion should suffice to show that
negotiating leverage will probably be changed by the new
provisions.
Consider the judgment debtor engaged in ongoing secured
financing in California. Before the legislature enacted the new
provisions, a judgment creditor would have had to deploy ex-
ecution and either attempt to levy on the collateral or search
for other unencumbered assets. Absent unencumbered property,
the judgment creditor's main obstacle was the presence of the
secured party who would assert prior rights to the collateral.
The judgment creditor's relatively high risk of getting nothing
or, worse, of litigation with a secured party, gave the judgment
creditor (or the creditor with a claim considering whether to get
a judgment) a powerful reason to settle with the debtor for less
than the claim or judgment.
Now that California's new judgment lien provisions are in
effect, that creditor's need to negotiate or settle drops markedly.
For the price of a simple U.C.C. filing, that judgment creditor
can destroy the debtor's secured financing and perhaps put her
out of business. The process is cheap and involves almost no
risk to the judgment creditor. The debtor must reorient priorities
in the direction of the judgment creditor, risk loss of secured
financing, or enter bankruptcy to avoid the judgment lien. It is
likely that in many cases the path of least resistance is to settle
with the judgment creditor. The settlement value of the judgment
in this situation has soared.
The same dynamics hold when the debtor in California has
unencumbered personal property. Before the advent of the new
provisions, the creditor's collection option was an actual levy
on the targeted personal property. The debtor's response could
have been to avoid that execution as a preference by filing a
bankruptcy petition within ninety days of the execution.149 The
debtor's power to thwart the creditor's expensive collection
efforts (and the chances that a seizure of property would prompt
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the debtor to do so) gave the creditor a large incentive to work
out a consensual resolution with the debtor.
The new provisions change that equilibrium. Because fixing
a judgment lien is so cheap, the creditor is unlikely even to
pause in response to the threat of the debtor's bankruptcy.
Furthermore, once the lien is in place, the debtor does not have
the same incentive to avoid it, because the lien has not deprived
the debtor of possession. The threat of a bankruptcy filing does
not carry the same leverage value for the debtor, because the
creditor will not have much of a net loss (only filing fees and
minimal effort) if the debtor files. Yet if the debtor does not file
a petition within 90 days of the fixing of the lien, the lien will
be unavoidable as a preference. 150 The leverage value bank-
ruptcy has for debtors both before and after the fixing of a lien
on personal property has been substantially reduced with these
new provisions. Once again, the settlement value of the judg-
ment has risen.
(2) Distributional implications of more valuable judgments.
So what's the problem, the reader may well ask. Is not easier
collection the underlying rationale for the provisions? Is not the
whole point to redistribute wealth from nonpaying debtors to
judgment creditors who fought hard for their judgments? Are
we not promoting with these provisions a central value in the
law, that judgments should be paid? Will not the greater collec-
tion system efficiency that comes with these statutes benefit
everyone? Questions like these cut to the heart of the problems
that come with oversimplified analysis of innovation in the
debtor-creditor field. Simply understanding that there can be
different answers to such questions is central in assessing the
merit of the new provisions.
If the normative proposition is that these provisions that im-
prove the settlement value of judgments are good simply be-
cause judgments should be paid, we are implicitly advancing
the premise that full, complete payment of judgments is an
unqualified good the law should seek to attain. But such a
premise flies in the face of several hundred years of legal history:
the law clearly does not do all it could do to secure the payment
of its judgments. It does not execute defaulting judgment debt-
ors; indeed, the legal system seldom imposes criminal sanctions
11o T  the extent that the lien might reach exempt property, the lien is probably
avoidable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
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on debtors, 151 and offers debtors the escape hatch of voluntary
bankruptcy. "Judgments should be paid" sounds absolute and
is difficult to quarrel with in the abstract; however, when we
consider the lengths to which the law actually goes to advance
the proposition, we find it is merely one of several competing
values in this field that the law might advance. If the law had
not qualified this proposition with bankruptcy, exemptions, lim-
its on the collection process, and system inefficiency, we would
have had to develop a different lexicon to express the complex-
ity of our normative conclusions on paying judgments. 152
If "judgments should be paid" does not supply a strong nor-
mative grounding, perhaps "efficiency" will. If some wasted
energy from the debtor-creditor system can be eliminated, all
participants in that system might be the beneficiaries and those
resources might be put to better economic use. The new pro-
visions will probably increase the settlement value of judgments
because they are cheaper to deploy. Is not everyone in business
a creditor and a debtor at various times and is not everyone
thus going to benefit from improved efficiency in the system?
Some important data bear on these points. Recent field studies
suggest that there may be a definable debtor group and a defin-
able creditor group. The work by Professors Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook mentioned earlier shows that small business
debtors account for a disproportionately high percentage of de-
faults resulting in business bankruptcy. 153 Small businesspeople
default more often than large businesspeople, and one might
therefore expect them to be on the debtor side more often than
they will be on the creditor side. If this is actually the case,
then to the extent that the new provisions increase the settle-
ment value of ajudgment, there will probably be a redistribution
of wealth from small business debtors to their creditors. 54 The
M There are some circumstances in which jail may follow nonpayment of judgments.
See Note, Body Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten But Not Gone, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 543 (1976); Note, Civil Arrest of Fraudulent Debtors: Toward Limiting
the Capias Process, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 853 (1973). See also Moses, Enforcement of
Judgments Against Hidden Assets, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 73.
152 Professor Warren makes this same point in connection with the lexicon of contract
doctrine. Warren, supra note 126, at 779.
153 In their study, the authors found that debtors with small businesses accounted for
10.4% of the bankruptcies but for only 7.3% of the general population. When they added
debtors who formerly had small businesses, the total accounted for 20% of the total
bankruptcy filings. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 131, at 205.
154 Creditors could respond to the new provisions by reducing their collection efforts
to net the same proceeds, thereby realizing a cost savings without improving the
settlement value of judgments. It seems unlikely that creditors would respond in this
way to the new provisions and the text proceeds on the assumption that they will not.
The question is ultimately an empirical one and a definitive answer awaits the evidence.
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point that a wealth redistribution will come with these provisions
was made earlier in connection with exemption protection but
the political content of the provisions is worth emphasizing again
in the business context.
Yet it remains difficult to quarrel with legislation that will
reduce legal waste, even if the immediate distributional effects
are politically delicate. After all, one might argue, reduced col-
lection costs will ultimately result in cheaper credit for business
debtors and a bounty of sorts for the broader economy. Once
again, however, one must be sensitive to other parts of the
system to see if there may be undesirable side effects of im-
proved ability to collect judgments.
One potential side effect is the impact the provisions might
have on the personal finances of business debtors. The finding
that small business debtors commingle their personal and busi-
ness finances suggests, once again, that exemptions may take
on enhanced importance with the new statutes. As the settle-
ment value of a judgment increases with the new provisions,
judgment debtors will need to divert resources previously allo-
cated elsewhere to settling accounts with judgment creditors.
Diversion of resources from family support and nutrition, for
example, might be more likely to occur under the new
provisions1 55 and might ultimately cost the broader economic
system more than the new provisions save. 156
b. Implications of More Valuable Judgments for Creditors with-
out Judgments
In traditional jurisdictions, both ordinary creditors and judg-
ment creditors can lay claim to the debtor's personal property
only at considerable expense. The judgment creditor must de-
"55 Cf. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 131, at 118-19.
156 One can imagine many ways these statutes could wind up costing more than they
save. Suppose the increased leverage supplied by these statutes and the tenacity of
small business debtors to hang on resulted in nutritional or shelter deficiencies for the
debtor and her family that the state ultimately had to remedy at high expense. Or
suppose the provisions turned out to hasten the financial demise of small businesses
which, in turn, resulted in lost jobs and unnecessary economic costs like moving
expenses, job search fees, and unemployment. It is easy to imagine these latter items
costing the overall economy more than the resources that are saved by the new statutes.
The counterpoint, of course, is that some debtors hang on longer than they "should"
and that it is indeed better that losing enterprises fail sooner rather than later. We do
not currently know where the optimal "failure point" is. The point here is that one's
opinions on the subject no doubt depend in part on the number of potential effects one
considers in assessing the facts.
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ploy execution procedures to get a lien; the person with a mere
claim must first get a judgment and then execute on it. Partly
because of expense and partly because the debtor can undo
execution with a bankruptcy petition, in many cases neither
ordinary creditor nor judgment creditor has considerable lev-
erage to force payment when the debtor has no real estate. In
those situations, extra-legal leverage may well play a larger role
than legal leverage in the debtor's decision to pay one creditor
before the next. Debtors may base priority in paying creditors
on their need for continued service or financing, for example,
rather than on the nature of the creditor's claim.
In judgment lien reform jurisdictions like California, the ad-
ditional legal leverage held by a creditor with a new judgment
lien may change the way the debtor allocates her inadequate
resources. That is precisely what makes these reform statutes
attractive in the first place: debtors will begin paying judgment
creditors sooner than they would otherwise-before they pay
others. Yet what impact will such a reordering of priorities have
on the debtor's economic survival? Might the reordering
squeeze the debtor in a way that accelerates financial demise?
As suggested earlier, unsecured creditors in these jurisdictions
seem less likely to benefit as much from bankruptcy, including
reorganization under Chapter 11, as they might have under more
traditional systems. They might therefore be less tolerant of late
payments and less flexible in working through difficult periods
with the debtor. The resulting increased pressure on the debtor
combined with a less viable bankruptcy process could yield an
unpredictable economic impact. Legislatures ought to consider
carefully whether the new statutes will lessen the chances for
economic survival of shaky businesses and, if so, whether that
is desirable as a policy matter.
The improved position of the judgment creditor in relation to
other creditors in the new systems raises yet another potentially
undesirable consequence: claimants' increased use of formal
judicial procedures to collect their debts. As developed earlier,
in most jurisdictions, creditors with judgments have substantial
disincentives to use the judicial process to enforce their judg-
ments. The judicial process is expensive, the results are uncer-
tain, and the debtor can file a bankruptcy petition and render
the efforts worthless in any event. The enforcement problems
no doubt work their way backwards in many cases to the point
where a claimant decides whether or not to bother to get a
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judgment. It makes little sense under the present systems to
begin a legal action in the first place if it will ultimately yield
little or no money. Additionally, in the old systems, claimants
and judgment holders are both unsecured creditors without
claims to specific personal property. In a case of difficult en-
forceability, a competing claimant need not worry much about
the judgment creditor. Indeed, if the judgment creditor at-
tempted enforcement, the claimant without a judgment might
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition 157 and thereby nullify the
short-lived competitive advantage.
As suggested earlier, one expects that most creditors with
judgments will get liens on personalty under the new systems,
because doing so is so inexpensive. Yet the very fact that those
with judgments will get liens as a matter of course upsets a kind
of equilibrium formerly held by ordinary claimants and judgment
creditors without liens. A creditor with a mere claim might have
to be more legally competitive in the new jurisdictions because
if a second creditor were to get a judgment first, that second
creditor could easily get a decisive competitive advantage in the
form of an earlier lien. Put another way, because judgments
have become more valuable both as against debtors and as
against other creditors, one expects the inter-creditor competi-
tion for judgments to increase.
If the new statutes will prompt an increased use of the judicial
system in debt collection, the value of the provisions comes
into serious question at two levels. The first is a question of
redistribution of debtor assets, this time among competing
claimants. The distributional problem is suggested by the ob-
servation that some creditors are able to obtain judgments more
easily than others and that the ease in getting judgments seems
to have little to do with the nature of the underlying claim. For
example, suppose the debtor assaulted claimant one, an individ-
ual, and failed to pay a loan installment to claimant two, a
finance company. Which of the two seems more likely to get
the first judgment and lien? Do we want a system that, in fact,
will create a high priority in relation to other creditors for those
that, because of the strength of their claims or the size of their
legal staffs, can most easily get judgments? As suggested earlier,
priority statutes typically award liens to creditors on the basis
of a policy judgment that the claimant is somehow deserving.
1S7 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1984 and Supp. IV 1986).
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The statutes under consideration here have made that kind of
distinction between those that get judgments and all others. It
seems very naive indeed to assume that all claimants have equal
access to judgments and that the most deserving of special
priority will be the ones who will obtain them.
The second level of questions goes to the tendency these
statutes may have to encourage formal, over informal, debt
collection itself. Under the traditional systems, a creditor, with
or without a judgment, can get a non-possessory lien on the
debtor's personal property by acquiring a consensual Article 9
security interest. To obtain that under the traditional proce-
dures, the debtor and creditor negotiate informally over debt
collection. To what extent will the incentives to make use of
informal measures decrease under the new provisions? To what
extent do the incentives actually encourage resort to the legal
system as a first, rather than last, move? Would we want to
move away from the present system in which nearly all debts
are settled informally and consensually? If use of formal pro-
cesses increases, would the filing fees associated with increased
use of formal processes fully cover the legal system's expanded
costs?'58 Might not the total system losses, given enhanced cred-
itor competitiveness, exceed those under more traditional
systems?
Indeed, can one even consider the new statutes "efficient"
when viewed in the context of the larger system? A seldom used
judicial system combined with a heavily used informal collection
system (the old system) may well be cheaper and more "effi-
cient" than a frequently used judicial system combined with less
reliance on the informal system. Once other values, such as
consensual dispute resolution as the preferred approach to debt
collection and the policy proposition that the most deserving
claimants ought to be the first paid from limited assets, are taken
into account, the conclusions that these statutes will yield a
bounty in saved costs are open to serious question.
18 None of the costs of informal dispute resolution are directly imposed on citizens
as taxes. If the filing and associated fees do not cover the system costs within the formal
system, an increased use of that system (and decreased use of the informal system)
would redistribute some dispute resolution costs now borne by creditors (and their
customers) to taxpayers. While one could develop a policy argument favoring a redis-
tribution of costs from creditors and their customers to taxpayers, the point here is tha
a legislature should not implicitly decide to redistribute those costs without considerinj
the policy implications.
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V. CONCLUSION
Those who practice or preach state collection law routinely
condemn state collection statutes as cumbersome, expensive,
and inefficient. As with modem architecture, in judgment col-
lection, lean and trim-efficient-is often thought of as inher-
ently better. The new statutes examined here offer possibly
drastic reductions in the inefficiency of the state collection ma-
chinery, and one's first instinct is to applaud and embrace the
new legislation. The impulse is to see the new provisions as
efficient, cost- saving, and innovative legislation that is desirable
within the debt collection system.
Yet, further examination of the statutes, particularly within
the larger context of the debtor-creditor system, produces am-
bivalence. It seems likely that the new statutes will have an
impact on the bankruptcy process as well as secured lending
under Article 9 of the U.C.C., that they will redistribute wealth
between debtor and creditor classes in the same way that chang-
ing exemption laws redistributes wealth, that they will set prior-
ities among creditors in ways that might not be desirable, that
they may have a substantial impact on the informal collection
process, that they may shift some costs of dispute resolution
from debtors and creditors to taxpayers, and that they may even
provoke lawsuits by a debtor's claimants who are fearful that
others will use these new provisions first. Indeed, when viewed
in this larger context, the statutes have remarkable political
implications, and there are serious questions about whether they
will produce the increased efficiency we first imagine or
whether, in fact, total system losses will be greater.
Even if one believes that "efficient" is "better," that a clean
facade is inherently superior to a decorated one, deciding
whether a proposal is "efficient" is enormously more compli-
cated than deciding whether a building is in the Second Empire
or International Style. In the debtor-creditor field, one cannot
simply look to outward appearances: determining whether a
proposal is "efficient" requires more than simply seeing whether
a procedural innovation will reduce the immediate legal costs.
A review of judgment lien reform statutes illustrates major
problems with easy conclusions about legal efficiency based on
too narrow a view of impact and too rigid an idea of those things
:o which we might attach value. It also demonstrates the central
ieed in this area of the law for extensive field work to assess
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the actual effects of legal change. These statutes have numerous
potential side effects that are not readily apparent and which, if
they occur, may not be desirable. The statutes' impact requires
close monitoring by both federal and state policy makers. Until
we have a better idea of their actual impact, legislatures would
be wise to move slowly in embracing these statutes.
2
